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UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN MISSOURI
UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN MISSOURI:
ITS TREND AS INDICATED BY PERSONAL LIBERTY
STATUTES AND POLICE REGULATIONS.
Decisions in cases involving the interpretation of statutes
concerning personal liberty and police regulations are so
closely interwoven that it is impossible to consider this class
of cases without treating the two together,-police power and
personal liberty. The class of cases falling under the pro-
visions of the Constitution concerning personal liberty may be
subdivided into the following classification: 1. police control
of the criminal classes; 2. police regulation of the press and
the freedom of speech; 3. police regulation of trades and pro-
fessions. The courts have without one exception never con-
strued this part of the Constitution in a loose manner. They
have accepted personal liberty as being only the power of do-
ing what we care to do, and in not being constrained to do
what we object to doing. No man has a right to make use
of his liberty so as to commit an injury to the rights of others.
His liberty is controlled by the oft quoted maxim, sic utere
tuo, ut alienum non laedas.
As to the first proposition, it is evident that the Missouri
Court has been more than lenient in permitting legislation con-
trolling the criminal element. The police power of the State
has been held to be a greater force than has been the objection
against such legislation because of its being class legislation
or special and oppressive regulation. Despite the leniency of
the courts towards legislation of this nature, it is quite evident
that such an ordinance as one making it an offense "to
k-nowingly associate with persons having the reputation of
being thieves, burglars, etc., for the purpose or with the intent
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to agree, to conspire, etc., to commit any offense, or to cheat
or defraud any person of any money or property, etc.," is
unconstitutional because the law takes no notice of and has no
concern with mere guilty intention unconnected with any overt
act or outward manifestation. The courts will go reasonably
far in permitting legislation of a preventive character, bnt
when it comes to trying a man for thinking, the Supreme Court
of Missouri held up its heavy hand and called a halt. They
have attempted to say, "Thus far shalt thou go and no far-
therl"
In 1908, thirteen years later, in the case of Saint Louis vs.
Gloner, the court again laid its arresting hand upon the over-
zealous legislator and gently slapped him in the face with this
sort of a decision. As long as a man doing what is termed
"striker's picket duty" did not interfere with the rights of
any other person or in any wise engage in disorderly conduct
or disturb the peace, he could not be prosecuted under an
ordinance against lounging around street corners. An ordi-
nance so providing was held invalid in the above case.
Under subdivision 2 falls Ex Parte Harrison,2 . decided
just two months later than the Gloner case (supra). The
statute which was declared void here, made criminal the re-
port by a civic league of the qualifications of candidates for
public office, without stating in full the facts upon which such
report was made. Aside from the fact that there was only
one decision possible in this case, it is of extreme interest that
this conclusion was reached by a Democratic Bench, during
the administration of a Democratic Governor elected by a
1. 210 Mo. 502.
2. 212 Mo. 88 (May 1908).
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Republican majority with a decidedly Republican Legislature.
The basis of the opinion was that the law impaired the freedom
of speech and was therefore void.
The statute under fire expressly stated also, that whether
scandalous, obscene or not, the facts upon which such report
was made must be stated in full. This does not quite harmo-
nize with the accepted judicial dictum, "The constitutional
liberty of speech and of the press, as we understand it, im-
plies a right to freely utter and publish whatever the citizen
may please, and to be protected against any responsibility for
so doing, except so far as such publications, from their blas-
phemy, obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public
offence or against the public conscience." It may be inferred
then that the Missouri court would, should the occasion arise,
declare unconstitutional any law which was in conflict with
the following dictum: "So also, is it not to be inferred from
a prohibition of the censorship of the press that the press can,
without liability for its wrongful use, make use of the constitu-
tional privilege for the purpose of inciting the people to the
commission of crime against the public. The newspapers of
anarchists and nihilists cannot be subjected to a censorship, or
be absolutely suppressed; but if the proprietors should in their
columns publish inflammatory appeals to the passions of dis-
contents, and urge them to the commission of crimes againat
the public or against the individual, they may very properly
be punished, and without doubt, the right to the continued
publication may be forfeited as a punishment for the crime."
As to the third subdivision, the general impression one re-
ceives from glancing over the digest is that everyone has a
right to pursue in a lawful manner any lawful calling which
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he may select. The court has given us to understand that a
person cannot be prohibited from engaging in any lawful
business, provided he does so in a lawful manner. The court
will also uphold legislation which subjects all occupations to
a reasonable regulation, where such regulation is required for
the protection of -public interests, or for the public welfare.
These regulations are subject to the restraints against class
legislation and arbitrary classifications. So in the case of
State vs. Webber,3 the statute requiring a peddler to have a
license was not a revenue measure, but a police regulation of
certain persons following a certain business, and not a tax upon
property. If the law is uniform as to all vendors of a par-
ticular article, the classification is not arbitrary, nor the law
special. It seems reasonable to suppose that any regulation
prohibiting women from engaging in the keeping of bar-rooms,
billiard-saloons, etc., would be upheld for the reason that they
would prove highly injurious to the public morals, while there
is no such peculiar objection to the keeping of such places by
men.
The decisions relating to personal liberty are very closely
mixed with those concerning police regulaLions of a more
general nature. To draw a broad conclusion, it may be said
that the trend of the courts has been to let down the barriers
placed by the constitution by designating certain statutes and
ordinances, police regulations, within the police power of the
state. As early as 1873, the court decided that a law provid-
ing for the disposal of dead animals, in spite of the fact that
it restrains a person from disposing of his property, is valid
as being a police regulation passed in good faith, for the pur-
3. 214 Mo. 272.
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puse of preserving the public health and abating nuisances.
The conservation of private rights is attained by the im-
position of a wholesome restraint upon their exercise, such
a restraint as will prevent the infliction of injury upon others
in the enjoyment of them; it involves a provision of means for
enforcing the legal maxim, which enunciates the fundamental
rule of both the human and natural law, sic utere tuo, ut aie-
num non laedas. It must of course, be within the range of
legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every
one may use his own as not to injure others. Any law which
goes beyond that principle, which undertakes to abolish rights,
the exercise of which does not involve an infringement of the
rights of others, or to limit the exercise of rights beyond what
is necessary to provide for the public welfare and the general
security, cannot be included in the police power of the govern-
ment.
In spite of the immense amount of power, the inclination
of the courts to construe certain legislation as being police
regulations, gives to the legislature in transgressing the con-
stitutional guaranties, the Texas Cattle Cases show a clear de-
termination not to go too far.4 These decisions, following
R. R. vs. Husen,5 decided that that type of legislation would
not do. The statute prohibited the introduction of Texas
cattle into the state between certain periods. The court held
that while the intention -of the Legislature was a worthy one,
it was so ultra-patriotic to the State of Missouri, so over-
zealous, that it had overlooked the Federal provisions that
4. Gilmore v. Hannibal and St. Joseph It t. Co., 67 Mo. 323. (1878).
Grimes v. Eddy, 126 Mo. 168 (1894). Selvege v. St. Louis & San Francisco
R. It. Co., 135 Mo. 163 (1896).
5. 96 U. S. 465,
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only Congress has the power to regulate commerce between
the several states. As a police regulation, the Railroad Com-
pany can be restrained from bringing cattle into the state,
but not in bringing them through the state. The courts how-
ever, have shown a disposition to compensate for the ill effects
of bringing these innoculated cattle through the state, by de-
cisions to the effect that if negligence is shown on the part of
the Railroad 'Company in transporting them through, the Com-
pany will be held in damages.
In State vs. Borden,6 the court in effect said that while we
have been extremely lenient in construing laws to be valid be-
cause of the police power, we are not going to stand for any
legislators pulling night-shades over our eyes with any such
statute as this. In no uncertain words the court held that the
legislature cannot arbitrarily declare any article of food in
general use, and concededly wholesome, to be unhealthy, and
its production and sale a crime. This case of State vs. Lay-
ton,7 involved pureness of a baking powder produced by the
defendant, Layton. Still, however, considering this decision,
it can still be said that the courts view with leniency regula-
tions in good faith for the general welfare of the public. As
all the courts are not invulnerable, and the Missouri court is
no exception, this inclination, which has become established
is like good horses ridden to death by prejudiced Justices, and
many decisions show the indelible stamp of a narrow, preju-
diced or biased purpose.
In 1908, a Democratic Court saw fit to discipline a Republi-
can Legislature by deciding that the police power must be
6. 164. Mo. 221.
7. 160 Mo. 474.
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jealously guarded and that a delegation of it to a commission
which was to have almost unlimited discretion, was an abuse
that would not be tolerated. The Legislature provided for a
State Grain Weighing and Inspection Commissioner who wis
to have discretion to decide at what places State Grain In-
spection was to be established. They thus had it in their
power to say at what times and in what territory the statute
shall apply, or whether or not it shall be in force at any time.
This was held to be simple despotism.8
In 1916, the court in Kansas City vs. Pingilley,9 held that
the ordinance declaring that any person who hires an auto-
mobile, and refuses to pay the reasonable pri. • shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be fined, etc.,
is in the absence of all fraud on the part of the hirer, invalid
as an indirect effort to evade the constitutional provision pro-
hibiting imprisonment for debt. The police power cannot be
used as a cloak to overthrow the constitutional inhibition of
imprisonment for debt.
Excepting these few cases in which statutes were refused
the judicial sanction as police regulations, the trend of Su-
preme Court decisions is decidedly one of laxity with regard
to this convenient subdivision of the law. The exceeding com-
plexity of the mechanical world has made necessary a certain
amount of elasticity in the unbending provisions of the consti-
tution, and the courts have with very good grace provided the
loop-hole by permitting statutes as police regulations. As a
modern example, it has been found better to regulate the pro-
duction of milk in the cities, than to hang to the seemingly un-
q. Mprebants Exchange v. Knott, 21 Mo. 616.
9. 269 Mo. 59.
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bending right of the individual to pursue whatever employ-
ment he pleases in whatever manner he pleases.
The recognized tests of constitutionality are from the very
nature of the case less definite in this field and so leave more
to judicial bias than in other fields of constitutional interro-
gation. There are a number of hazy expressions such as,-
"for the welfare of the people"; "for the better health of
the public, their morals, etc.", and a host of similar phrases.
It can easily be seen that there is a sufficient amount left to
the discretion of the judge in determining whether a particu-
lar statute or ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power
of the State. The rapidly increasing amount of litigation in
this field, of course, will encompass and tie down the courts
in the construction of statutes of this type more and more, un-
til finally there will be very little room for judicial bias and
decisions bearing the stamp of arrogant, narrow, and unjust
judges.
Loins M. BoHNBmNrn,, '25.
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